The task of specifying all possible house-hold situations where a marriage penalty (or he-ne-fit) occurs is very difficult, and is not a ye-my rewarding exercise. However, the fundamental. characteristics of the situation remain if a few simplifying assumptions aremade: 1) the standard deduction is mmsed by all taxpayers; 2) all income is derived from wages and/or salaries;
3) all married couples file-joint returns; 4) household adjusted gross incomes are $30,000 or less; and 5) household members have-no children.
While these assumptions are limiting, all except the last assumption are fairly widespread. Even the exclusion of children from the-examnple is not that unusual. In March 1976, 15 percent of all husband-wife households were childless and both spouses were-employed.
2 With regard to the other assumptions, analymThis assummes that they used the standiard deduction, claimed no dependents, and all income was derived from wages or salaries.
'Typical' Family Not So Typical," St. Loui.s Post-Dispatch, March 14, 1977 . For a discussion of the effects of children on the tax penalty on married workers, see Joyce M. Nnssbanm, sis of 1973 tax returns indicates that 65 percent of all returns utilized the standard deduction.
3 Wages and salaries represented 83 percent of adjusted gross incomes in 1973 and 95 percent of all married couples filed joint returns. The-Internal Re-venue-Service reported that 96 percent of all taxpayers in 1976 had adjmmste-cI gross incomes be-low $30,000.T he-basis for calculations of the tax penalty on mnarried workers is the comparison of tax liabilities of a man and \voman, holding constant everything except their marital status. This is not a frivolous exercise when consideration is give-n to the-employment statistics dealing with married couples. According to March 1976 data, there were 47.3 million husbandwife families. be rationalized a. a me-astir of differing exp nses
incurred in earn ng income-and hen cc differing abilities to pan an roug hon eholds.
Mr C $30,000
Total Hon hold C~O,0oo
Th term neutral t 'pplsed to the coneep of taxe or ins e-sts us new business come e ne-n, Mr.
and Mr. C should pay the s me qumpme-nt Apparently h se are actrs-iti s which --soci ty finds be-mi ficial and pm motes through tax 1 For a sin e compl t discussion of the de irable a p ct of preferences (deduct ons).
taxe-and actual characteristic of ta es ee Richard and Even the Internal Re-venue Service-apparently re-cogFederal taxes if they are-married, rather than single.
nizes the possible benefits of filing as single taxpayers. If the-number is positive-, John and Jane would benefit from a tax saving of that amount if they are-marUouar/~oid C/wme/ensiwa: ried, rather than single-. For example, if Jane makes The outlined area of the table indicates those comresenting Jane's income to the-right until it intersects hinations of incomes which are associate-cl with a tax with the-vertical column corresponding to John s income. If the number at the-intersection is negative, "Ibis neglects the-loss of any welfare-paynients or earnedl John and Jane must pay that amount in additional incmimd lax crcdits John would lose-by ninrrying Jane.
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This reduces each of their AGFs to $14,250, Ior a combined total of $28,500, As manried taxpayers, they can also deduct 8750 apiece as personal exemptions, leaving a household AGI of $28,500. Thus, the personal exemption has not contributed directly to either a tax benefit or penalty on marriage.
Next, each single taxpayer can subfract the standard deduction equal to 16 percent of AGI, hut not less than $1,700 or greater than $2,400. As a single taxpayer, 16 percent of John's AGI is $2,400, the maximum allowable standard deduction. Jane can also i' -deduct $2,400 as a single taxpayer. If single, John and Jane each take standard deductions which total $4,800, leaving tax.ahle-incomes of $11,850 each ($23,700 combined). In contrast, as married taxpayers, their maximum allowable standard deduction is $2,800 leaving taxable income of $25,700. Thus, the s-tandard deduction benefits the two taxpayers more when they are single than when they are married, Next, the tax rates are applied to taxable inoome in order to determine the tax liability, It is Lmportant to note that there are four different tax rate schedules.
Single-taxpayers with dependents use the "he-ad of house-hold" tax schedule-. Single people-who do not qualify as a head of house-hold must use the-tax rate-s for single taxpayers. Married taxpayers may either file-a joint or separate-re-turn. The-tax schedule for monried taxpayers filing separately differs from the rate-s applied to single taxpayers. The-"married separate-" schedule-applies "married joint" rates to half the income that would he taxed at each level on the-"married joint" schedule-. Consequently, the-tax rateprogression is much steeper on the-"married separate" schedule, Unless one-spouse-has a large-amount of tax preferred income, such as capital gains or medical expenses, a married couple-usually minimizes their tax liability by filing a joint ne-turn.
John and Jaue-, as single-taxpayers must pay taxes on $11,850 of income each. This puts them in the-27 percent marginal bracket of the tax nate schedule for single-taxpayers. Consequently, John and Jane each have-tax liabilities of $2,583 for a total of $5,166?0 As married taxpayers, John and Jane-have-$25,700 of joint taxable-income, which puts them in the 36 percent marginal tax bracket for manned taxpayers filing joint returns. Their joint tax liability is $6,272 or $1,106 more-than the-in combined tax liabilities as single taxpayers. Thus, tax rate-s he-ne-fit tsvo single taxpayers more than two married taxpayers.n In summary, give-n the simplifying assumptions made above, tile-standancl deduction, the tax rate schedules, and 1976 tax cre-dlits contribute-to the-additioual Fe-die-ral income taxes paid by mammied working taxpayers sisnpiy' because-of their nianital status.°T he-se figure-s are taken from the 1976 Tax Table, which the iRS prepares. Since-1976 taxes are-calculated over $50 come-intervals for incomes less than $20,000, the liability is slightly lower, than if calculated frosn the tax rateschedule-s. 15 The-fact that single taxpayers have less taxable-income-as a re-stilt of larger d,omnhiue-d standard 1 deductinni doe-s bias downward the-applicable-tax bracket. However, because-the tax rate schedule-s dill-er between married 1 and simsgle-taxpayers, tax rate-s still contribute to the-generally lower tax liability' for two single taxpayers, si'hose combined income-s equal a married cc)up Ic's joint in come-. There are se-venal impomtant consequences of the tax penalty imposed on two married workers. One-readily apparent effect of this differential tax treatment is that 1976 tax lairs made-it more-expensive for two married people-to svork. The disincentive to work provided by tax laws affects the-money standard of living which a household will achieve-. If the tax lasvs make it more-expensive-to work, other things held constant, households will achieve a lower money income-than would be otherwise-possible.
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The-work disincentive of the tax laws is of particular importance in the-decision of married svome-n to enter the-labor force-. Since-it is traditionally (hut not always correctly) assumed that the husband is the primary breadwinner, the wife-is typically considered to have greater latitude-in deciding to enter the-labor force.
In making a rational decision to go to work, a wife would halance (either explicitly or implicitly) theadded costs of going back to work, such as child care expenses, transportation costs, appropriate clothes, etc., against the-additional income she will earn. Theadditional income will he he-n salary after taxes and other deductions. The-tax penalty on married workers reduces her salary more-than if she were-single.
For example, if her husband make-s $10,000, the last dollar of his income is taxed at 19 percent.
12 When i2Thd figure-assume-s that the-standard deduction is used, all iue-ome is derived from wage-s or salaries, and the married couple has no dependents andl file-s a joint re-tom.
the-wife-goes to work, since-her husband is already working and paying taxes, tile-first dlollar of hen income-is taxed at 19 pence-nt. That is, her income-doe-s not benefit from exemptions, deductions, or lowe-n marginal tax rates applicable-on initial amounts of income. Consequently, the-tax strncture has a negative-influence-on the labor force participation of married women. Of course-, other factors can and have offset this influence, as evident from the-increase-in the-labor force participation rate of married women in re-ce-mit years.
Another effect of the disparity between the tax treatment of workers who are married and those ivho are single is an increase-in Government revenue-. TheGovernment collects more-taxes, under the eircunustances outlined above-, when two workers m any rather than re-main single-. In adidition, when married workers receive cost-of-living adjustments, theGovernment also benefits, as mentioned earlier, sine-c the extra tax liability on married workers increases as their incomes increase. Thus, the tax penalty on married workers make-s the Government's deficit less than it would be otherwise.
A final consideration is that the-differentiation of tax liability based only on marital status tends to undermine the equity which many people-expect to find in the tax system. The less "just" a tax, the more incentive the-ne is to find ways to avoid paying the tax, and this in turn reduces tax re-venues on increase-s the cost of enforcing tax laws.
.t. I~,.1 rcA.) Considering the traditionally high value placed on marriage-, family, and work in American society. it is likely that steps will eventually be-take-n to reduce the tax penalty imposed on married workers. Theexistence of this penalty is itself the-nesult of previous Gongnessional actions which attempted to connect apparent inequities in the tax stnucture. Prior to 1948, husbands and wives in community property state-s could each claim half of their household income-fon tax purposes, even if only oue-of the spouses actually earned all of the income. For example, if one spouseearned $20,000 and the other was not employed outside the home, each claimed $10,000 of income-. Given the progressively higher marginal tax rates, two incomes of $10,000 were-taxed less than one-$20,000 income-, In noncommunity property states, this he-ne-fit was not available. A provision referred to as income--splitting was added to the Federal income tax struc-
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tune in 1948 to make this benefit available to all married taxpayers. This was done by doubling the-incomeranges for marnie-d taxpayers associated with each tax rate. For example-, if the-first $500 of income-we-re taxed at 14 percent for a single penson, the-first $1,000 of income-for married couple-s would be taxed at 14 percent.
While the income--splitting provision extended tax benefits to married couples in all of the states, single taxpayers we-ne now subject to much higher marginal tax rates than a married person making the-same income, hut able-to be-ne-fit fnom the income-splitting provision. Perceiving the-harsher tax treatment of single people-, lawmakers loivered the tax rates for single-s in 1971. As Table III shoxvs. prior to 1971, single taxpayers with the-same-taxable-income-(income after subtracting personal exemptions and deductions) as manned taxpayers filing jointly couldl pay as much as 42 percent more-taxes than a married couple. The 1971 nate changes for single-taxpayers reduced this differential to 20 pence-nt. In reducing rates for single taxpayers, however, a tax penalty fon households in which both spouse-s are employed resulted.
Measunes already enacted to change-1977 tax laws alter the standard deductions allowed single and married taxpayers, thereby partially reducing the-tax penalty on married workers. In 1976 the maximum for a special tax deduction to he granted to families where both spouses work outside the home, to deal explicitly with the tax penalty on man'ie-d workers.14 Under this proposal, the spouse-with the lower income would be allowed to deduct 10 percent of the first $6,000 of earnings. This proposal xvould benefit lower income couple-s relatively more-than couples with higher incomes.
An alternative method, not inchided in the Treasury proposals, would completely eliminate the tax penalty on man'ied workers. Married individuals who both work could he given the option of using the-single-tax rate schedule. Couples could compute their taxes using the "married joint," "married separate-," and "single" schedules and use the status which minimizes their joint tax liability, with the provision that both spouse-s must use-the same schedule-. Two individuals, who both work, can he-taxed more if they are married than if they are-single-. The more equal their income-s and the larger their incomes, the greaten the-tax penalty on married workers. The standlardl deduction, tax rate schedule, and individual tax credit prox'isions contributed to the greater tax liability for man'ied c'oupk~sin 1976. The tax penalty can he-viewed as either a disincentive-for working, single people-to marry, or as a disincentive for juanned people to work. \Vlule Congressional intent has ne~-er shown an active interest in influencing sue-Il decisions, the tax structure imposes a tax pe-nalt or benefit ou households depending On the marital and employment status of the-house-hold members.
In a broaden context, the-tax penalty on married workers is illustrative of the complex and sometimes unintended consequences of tax provisions. Tax credits and reductions have bee-n prescribed from time to tIme-to "stimulate" the economy, reduce energy consumption, promote capital formation, and aid various other social and economic causes. While the intended objectives of these tax provisions may be worthwhile and laudable, the unintended consequence-s may be unacceptable and contrary to social values. The tax penalty on married workers illustrates the necessity of careful consideration of all of the possible consequences of tax proposals.
